We examine a political agency problem in repeated elections where an incumbent runs against a challenger from the opposing party, whose policy preferences are unknown by voters. We first ask: do voters benefit from attracting a pool of challengers with more moderate ideologies? When voters and politicians are patient, moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians (those close to the median voter) reduces voter welfare by reducing an extreme incumbent's incentives to compromise. We then ask: do voters benefit from informative signals about a challenger's true ideology? We prove that giving voters informative, but su ciently noisy, signals always harm voters, because they make it harder for incumbents to secure re-election.
Introduction
This paper examines how changes in the ideology distribution of individuals running for o ce or in the information voters have about candidates a↵ect equilibrium outcomes and voter welfare. These are important determinants of equilibrium behavior for two reasons.
First, in the predominately two-party system in the United States, an incumbent o ceholder typically runs for re-election against an untried challenger drawn from the opposing party.
Voters know far more about an incumbent because they see her policy choices in o ce. In contrast, a challenger is a risky option whose true preferences are unknown. As a result, an incumbent can implement policies away from the median voter's preferred policy and still win re-election. Second, in this two-party system, the likely policy choices that a challenger might select if elected serve as the chief device with which voters can discipline o ce-holders to control this political agency problem. The fear of losing to the opposing party's candidate who may implement policies far from an incumbent's ideal policy provides a key inducement to incumbents to moderate policy choices when politicians cannot commit to policies.
We begin by addressing a basic question: when do voters benefit from attracting a better pool of challenging candidates? Concretely, when do voters gain if challengers are more likely to hold views closer to those of the median voter? We then ask: do voters benefit from receiving an informative, but noisy, signal about a challenger's ideology prior to an election?
That is, do voters benefit from learning about a challenger's views of the world, so that they can more precisely predict her likely policy choices if elected?
These changes in the ideology distribution of candidates or the information available to voters may reflect changes in the political environment-e.g., changes in the degree of ideological polarization between competing interest groups, the behavior of media outlets covering politics, or the institutions governing primary elections, campaign financing and spending-studied by the political economy literature. Our analysis complements this literature and provides insights into the possible equilibrium implications of such changes.
Our core model builds on the infinite horizon, repeated elections models of Duggan (2000) and . It features a pool of politicians with ideologies symmetrically distributed around the median voter, divided into a left-wing [ 1, 0] and a right-wing [0, 1] party. We investigate the welfare of voters who incur quadratic disutility from policies that deviate from their preferred policies. Equilibrium outcomes are characterized by two ideology cuto↵s, w and c, where 0 < w < c < 1. When in o ce, "centrist politicians" with ideology i 2 [ w, w] implement their preferred policies and are re-elected. "Moderate politicians" with ideology i 2 (w, c) choose to compromise and adopt policy w in order to win re-election, while politicians in ( c, w) compromise to w. "Extreme politicians" with ideology i 2 [ 1, c] [ [c, 1] implement their preferred policies, but lose re-election.
In an ideal world, with no other agency problems, social welfare would be maximized by a pool of politicians whose interests were perfectly aligned with the median voter's, and hence would want to adopt the median's preferred policies. But, in practice, selecting challengers is a complex, noisy process, resulting in significant variation in the realized preferences of challengers, and substantial voter uncertainty about a challenger's preferred policies. In this context, the welfare e↵ects of attracting more politicians with ideologies close to the median and fewer politicians with ideologies far from the median are less clear. The direct benefit from attracting a better population of challengers is obvious-when replacing an incumbent, most voters want to elect as moderate a challenger as possible. However, improved selection of challengers also adversely feeds back to a↵ect incentives of o ce holders to moderate policy choices to win re-election. In particular, an o ce holder does not mind losing by as much if she is likely to be replaced by a moderate rather than an extremist from the opposing party: better challengers weaken the threat of replacement that voters use to discipline incumbents. This gives rise to a negative indirect e↵ect of moderating challengers-cuto↵ c falls, as more incumbents choose to implement extreme policies. Do voters benefit from attracting a more moderate pool of challengers? We show that if voters and politicians are su ciently impatient, then given any two ideology distributions of challengers, voters always prefer the more moderate distribution.
1 Intuitively, when incumbent politicians do not care much about the future, they do not care much about compromising to be reelected. The indirect negative welfare e↵ects for voters of changes in cuto↵ c are then small relative to the direct benefits of ideology moderation.
In sharp contrast, if voters and politicians are patient, moderating the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians, while keeping constant the ideology distribution of more extreme politicians, hurts voters. To understand why, observe that (i) although centrist and moderate politicians have ideologies i 2 ( c, c), they only implement policies in the smaller set [ w, w]; and (ii) when players are patient, the compromise cuto↵ w is close to the median voter, but c is far away. As a result, moderation in the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians only provides a small direct benefit to the median voter, since these politicians already implement policies close to the median. In contrast, ideology c is far from the median voter and the policy set [ w, w] , so moderation of centrist and moderate politicians has a large direct positive impact on a right-wing incumbent's expected payo↵ from being replaced by a left-wing challenger. This causes enough extreme incumbents to cease compromising that the direct benefit is swamped, reducing voter welfare.
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What happens when ideology moderation shifts the distribution of extreme politicians?
A naïve conjecture would be that when the proportion of extreme politicians is reduced, voter welfare would always rise. This conjecture is false. We consider a class of linear ideology distributions, for which moderation implies a rotation that shifts extreme ideologies closer to the median. We show that such moderating shifts reduce voter welfare as long as politicians and voters are su ciently patient.
Our findings indicate that one must be cautious when evaluating the welfare impacts of changes to the processes that select challengers. Many institutional or strategic changes may lead to a pool of more moderate challengers-a shift from a closed to open primary system that draws more independents; increased party filtering of challengers to improve electability; or increased concerns of primary voters for more moderate candidates, with better chances in the general election. Alternatively, reductions in the opportunity cost of running for o ce, e.g., increased compensation, may di↵erentially appeal to "good" (moderate) challengers. Our findings highlight that di↵erentially drawing particularly attractive, moderate challengers robustly and paradoxically reduces voter welfare whenever voters and o ceholders are patient. Indeed, a robust empirical feature of electoral competition is that "weak" incumbents who adopt extreme policies are more likely to draw "good" challengers.
Paradoxically, this endogenous response raises the incumbent's incentives to adopt extreme policies, harming voters.
Having characterized how a more moderate distribution of challenger ideologies a↵ects outcomes, we next characterize how more information about challengers a↵ects outcomes.
Specifically, we derive the impact of a political campaign process prior to an election that reveals information to voters about a challenger's attributes. We want to understand whether and when voter learning via the electoral process improves political outcomes. We suppose that voters receive a binary (good or bad) signal about a challenger's true preferences, for example, reflecting an endorsement by an informed interest group. A good signal indicates that a challenger's ideology is more likely to be closer to the median, while a bad signal means that it is more likely to be farther away. Now, incumbents with su ciently extreme ideologies must compromise by more to defeat a challenger following a good signal about the challenger than following a bad one. We identify su cient conditions such that all incumbents who compromise do so by enough to win re-election against all challengers. In particular, this is so whenever the signal about the challenger is su ciently noisy. Intuitively, when signals are noisy, re-election standards vary little with the signal realization-by compromising a little more, an incumbent gains a discrete increase in the probability of re-election.
We then derive a very negative result for the impact of learning about challengers: more accurate signals about challengers always harm voters provided that incumbents who compromise do so by enough to defeat all challengers. To understand why, suppose the political process conveys no information to voters about challengers other than party a liation. Then voters would be better o↵ if they could commit to relaxing the policy standard for re-election, i.e., if they could commit to re-electing incumbents who compromise by slightly less than what is required for re-election in equilibrium. At the equilibrium standard, the median voter is just indi↵erent between re-electing the incumbent and trying the risky challenger.
The median voter does not internalize that if he set a slacker standard, then more extreme incumbents would choose to compromise to win re-election, rather than locate extremely.
The welfare gain from greater compromise is first-order, and the cost from slightly ine cient replacement is second-order. Now consider slightly informative signals about a challenger.
A good signal about a challenger induces voters to set a stricter re-election standard, and all incumbents who choose to compromise do so to that stricter standard. Because the compromise costs of re-election are raised, more extreme incumbents choose to adopt their preferred extreme policies and lose, and this hurts voters. Moreover, increasing the signal's accuracy and making it harder to secure reelection further decreases voter welfare, as long as incumbents who compromise do so by enough to defeat all challengers.
Informative signals about the challenger harm voters by more when they are more patient or when politicians are likely to have extreme ideologies. In both scenarios, more incumbent types compromise. This means that an incumbent politician who is just indi↵erent between compromising and not has a more extreme ideology. Hence, changes that make the re-election cuto↵ stricter reduce an incumbent's payo↵ from compromising by more, making her more likely to stop compromising and, instead, to adopt as policy her own extreme ideology.
There are many factors that a↵ect the amount of noise in the information about challenging candidates that reaches voters: the media's coverage of campaigns, the laws governing campaign expenditures (e.g., the Citizen's United ruling), increased exposure to social media, and so on. As we show, one must be cautious when evaluating the welfare impacts of such changes: voters may benefit from very informative signals about challengers, but su ciently noisy signals are always worse than no information.
The paper's outline is as follows. We next review the literature. Section 2 presents our base model. Section 3 analyzes how the distribution of politician ideologies a↵ects outcomes and welfare. Section 4 considers campaigns that provide informative signals about a challenger. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
Related Literature
Our paper relates to a literature on the equilibrium consequences of noisy signals about candidates. In the single-election models of Carrillo and Castanheira (2008) In our dynamic model, noisy signals about future challengers negatively a↵ects the behavior of current incumbents. Incumbents anticipate that voters will be more tempted to elect a future candidate if they observe a "good" signal (i.e., the challenger is more likely to be moderate), which makes current reelection standards harder. Moreover, losing to a "good" challenger is less costly for the incumbent, since she is expected to be more moderate.
These two e↵ects combined reduce an incumbent's incentive to compromise by too much, reducing voter welfare. Dewan and Hortala-Vallve (2014) also study a dynamic model in which information about a challenger makes it harder for an incumbent to guarantee reelection, possibly reducing voter welfare. Interestingly, the mechanism driving their negative welfare result is the opposite of ours: in their model, voters lose because some incumbents ine ciently choose a risky policy to increase their reelection chances, while in our model voters lose because some incumbents give up on reelection and choose an extreme policy.
Our paper also relates to a recent literature on how some degree of ideological extremism may benefit voters. In Van Weelden (2013 , 2014 , voters care about one policy dimension and the expropriation of resources. He assumes that voters can perfectly select a challenger's ideology. He shows that it is optimal to select slightly-ideologically irresponsible challengers in order to raise the cost of replacement to an o ce holder and thereby induce them to reduce their theft of resources. In Bernhardt et. al (2009), voters want policies to adapt to a random state of the world. When candidates propose platforms that have a certain degree of polarization, the possibility of choosing between the candidates allows voters to select the policy that better adapts to the realized state. In our framework, there is no need to adapt policies to unknown states, nor do voters trade o↵ di↵erent policy dimensions. However, we provide broad conditions under which a more extreme distribution of politicians' ideologies benefits patient voters. In our model, under these conditions, the threat of being replaced in the future by a more extreme challenger indirectly benefits voters by increasing an incumbent's incentives to compromise to such an extent that it dominates the always negative direct e↵ect on voters of selecting politician ideologies from a more extreme distribution.
Basic Model
We build on the infinite horizon, repeated elections models of Duggan (2000) There is a continuum of infinitely-lived voters, each indexed by his private ideology challenger's ideology is not known by voters, but its distribution is common knowledge.
In order to guarantee the existence of an equilibrium, we assume that 
Equilibrium and Voter Welfare
Equilibrium Concept: We focus on the class of symmetric, stationary perfect Bayesian equilibria described by Duggan (2000) for at-large selection, and extended to party selection Voter Welfare: To measure voter welfare, we use the median voter's expected discounted payo↵ from electing an untried challenger. In a symmetric equilibrium with quadratic preferences, the payo↵ derived by a voter from electing an untried challenger from either party with equal probability equals that of the median voter minus a constant that reflects the distance of the voter's ideology to the median. That is, ex ante (at time t = 0), all voters share the median voter's preference ordering over di↵erent symmetric equilibria. 7 Thus, focusing on the payo↵ of voters and disregarding the payo↵s of incumbent politicians, our welfare concept is Pareto e ciency.
The Value of Moderation
In this section we address the question: what is the value of selecting challengers from a pool of politicians with more moderate ideologies? We want to identify the conditions under which voters benefit from selecting from a pool of politicians whose world views tend to better reflect those of the median voter. In practice, the distribution of challenger ideologies depends on the opportunity cost of running for o ce, which may di↵erentially impact 
Analysis
We refer to politicians with ideologies further from the median voter as "more extreme", and those with ideologies closer to the median as "more moderate." Consistent with this idea, we use the following definition to compare di↵erent distributions of politicians' ideologies:
F R . Equivalently, we say that F R is "more extreme" than F 0 R .
In equilibrium, politicians with ideologies further from the median voter implement more extreme policies. This raises the basic question: do voters benefit from drawing challenging candidates from a more moderate distribution of ideologies? If so, when do they benefit? A more moderate ideology distribution has a positive direct e↵ect and a negative indirect e↵ect. Holding constant the equilibrium strategy of incumbents, 10 the direct impact of having a more moderate distribution of politicians' ideologies is that the median voter now expects a higher payo↵ from electing a challenger, who is expected to implement policies closer to the median. From an incumbent's perspective, however, more ideologically-moderate challengers mean that losing re-election is less costly, since a challenger is less likely to implement an extreme policy if elected. This makes incumbents less willing to compromise (reduces
for all i, and the inequality is strict for some i. 9 Throughout this Section we focus our discussion on the comparison between economies featuring right-wing ideology distributions F R and F 0 R . It is implicit that we always consider symmetric parties, that is, we always consider symmetric left-wing ideology distributions F L and F But, what if voters and politicians are patient? Our first contribution is to define a comprehensive su cient condition for patient voters to prefer a more extreme distribution of politicians's ideology.
To understand the definition, consider an economy A with ideology distribution F R and an economy B with distribution F 0 R , such that F R k F 0 R . Recall that we symmetrically define left-wing candidates, and that the overall distribution of politicians' ideologies has support [ 1, 1] . Cuto↵ k divides politicians into two groups: a group with ideologies ( k, k) in the middle of the distribution, and a group with ideologies [ 1, k] [ [k, 1] that comprises the tails of the distribution. Both economies feature the same distribution of politicians in the tails, but economy B has a more moderate ideology distribution (in the FOSD sense) in the middle of its support. That is, as we move from the "more extreme" economy A to the "more moderate" economy B, the ideology distribution of politicians ( k, k) around the median voter moves closer to the median, while the ideology distribution of tail politicians remains the same. The intuition behind the result is then the following. Consider changing the economy from the more extreme distribution F R to the more moderate distribution F 0 R . Consider the median voter's decision of whether to reelect a right-wing incumbent, or to elect an untried left-wing challenger. Moderation of centrist and moderate politicians provides a small direct benefit to the median voter, since these politicians are already implementing policies close to the median voter. Now consider the decision of a right-wing incumbent with an extreme ideology around c. When politicians are patient, the cuto↵ ideology c is far from the median voter. As a result, the moderation of centrist and moderate politicians has a large direct positive impact on the expected payo↵ of this extreme right-wing incumbent if she is replaced by a left-wing challenger. This causes a large decrease in c: enough extreme incumbents cease compromising that the net result is that voter welfare is harmed. Paradoxically, improvements in the distribution of political ideologies reduce welfare by more precisely when politicians tend to be extreme. This reflects that decreases in c are more harmful when more politicians have extreme ideologies close to c, i.e., when f R (c) is high.
, since a politician with the median ideology is always a centrist, 0 < w for all 2 (0, 1).
Given k 2 (0, 1) and distributions F R k F 0 R , Proposition 1 requires voters to be suciently patient. But what does su ciently patient mean? Loosely speaking, when k is closer to one, agents must be more patient in order to ensure that we only change the ideology distribution of centrist and moderate politicians, k < min{c, c 0 }. When k is closer to zero, the result in Proposition 1 extends when agents are less patient. We now establish that for any fixed discount 2 (0, 1) and F 0 R , voters prefer the more extreme ideology distribution whenever k is su ciently small: fixing 2 (0, 1) and F 
, and
, all voters strictly prefer the more extreme ideology distribution F R .
This result has two important implications. First, every moderation of ideologies that only involves politicians whose ideologies are close enough to the median voter harms all voters.
Second, since given any fixed discount factor we have k ⇤ > 0, there always exist more extreme ideology distributions of politicians that benefit all voters. R that takes the form of eliminating all probability mass on the most extreme ideologies and redistributing it uniformly across the remaining more moderate ideologies.
In that case, moderation always benefits voters: such an extreme form of moderation has such a large direct positive payo↵ impact on the median voter that it always dominates the negative impact of a lower compromise cuto↵ c. That is, eliminating the worst possible o ce holders is always welfare enhancing.
However, not every ideology moderation involving extreme politicians is beneficial. To better understand when moderating shifts in the distribution of challengers benefit voters, we next numerically solve for equilibrium voter welfare when the density of right-wing ideologies f R is linear. This lets us capture the degree of moderation with a single parameter. Similar to Proposition 1, we find that moderation hurts voters when agents are su ciently patient.
Linear densities
Suppose that party R consists of politicians with ideologies i 2 [0, 1], distributed according to the probability density function
where
Party L consists of politicians with ideologies i 2 [ 1, 0], distributed according to
The associated cumulative distribution function is Parameter ↵ captures the degree of ideological moderation. A higher ↵ means that challengers are more likely to have ideologies closer to the median voter's. The distributions are uniform when ↵ = 1. The expected ideology of a party R candidate is
, and 
Nega1ve"Value" of"Modera1on"
Posi1ve"Value" of"Modera1on" When agents are even modestly patient, moderation has a non-monotonic impact on welfare. For any discount factor > 0.2, voter welfare first falls in ↵, before rising. That is, when ↵ is su ciently low-so politicians are likely to be extreme-marginal increases in the moderation parameter ↵ increase the expected extremism of policies implemented by incumbents, harming voters. Figure 3 shows that for plausible discount factors, > 0.5, the marginal value of a more moderate pool of challengers is negative unless the distribution of political ideologies is already quite moderate (↵ much greater than one). This reflects that if enough politicians have moderate-to-extreme ideologies just below c, the extremism e↵ect of the decrease in c dominates. Moreover, when many politicians have extreme ideologies and agents are patient, the compromising incentives generated by party competition are largeincumbents are very concerned about losing to a challenger from the opposing party. In this case, moderation of challengers sharply reduces the incentives to compromise generated by party competition.
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4 The "Value" of Information about Challengers introduces political parties to the repeated election framework of Duggan (2000) . Party labels are informative because candidates from di↵erent parties have ideologies drawn from opposing sides of the ideological spectrum. When ousting an incumbent from o ce, this additional information allows voters to select a challenger from the opposing party. Incumbents dislike being replaced by someone with a more distant ideology, so they become more willing to moderate policy choices, raising voter welfare. Thus, in that model, the value of information (party labels) is always positive.
We next characterize how equilibrium outcomes are a↵ected when, in addition to the information conveyed by party labels, voters receive a noisy, but informative, signal about a challenging candidate's ideology. When voters can partially distinguish between challengers, they are more willing to replace an incumbent when they receive a signal suggesting that the challenger is more likely to be a moderate, than when the signal suggests that she is an extremist. We want to understand whether voters benefit from such additional learning about challengers.
To do this we extend our basic model by introducing a noisy binary signal about a challenger's ideology. This signal's natural interpretation is as a binary signal "endorsement"
or "no endorsement" by informed interest groups. Although we take this signal's origin as exogenous, we describe how one can endogenize the source and information content of the signal by studying public endorsements from informed interest groups.
As before, right-and left-wing politicians are drawn from probability distributions F R and F L . After the incumbent implements her policy but before the election, voters observe a noisy public signal about the challenger's ideology.
Consider a left-wing incumbent facing a right-wing challenger. Recall that voters' prior belief is that the challenger has an ideology i 2 [0, 1] drawn from the probability density function f R . After a challenger is selected, voters learn about the challenger, observing a The likelihood function ⇡ of signal ⇧ is then
is the prior probability of a good signal. Thus, a higher indicates a more informative signal. When = 1, the likelihood function ⇡ is as informative of i as is the benchmark ⇡, and when = 0, the likelihood function ⇡ is completely uninformative.
Further, the unconditional probability of signal realization s G does not vary with :
This structure isolates the e↵ects of a change in signal accuracy from those of the prior probability ⇢ of signal realization s G .
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When signal ⇧ generates realization s 2 {s G , s B }, Bayes' rule yields the following updated probability density functions,
Thus, posteriors are a weighted average of the maximum feasible information captured by
, and the prior belief f R , where the weight on the information in the signal is . It is straightforward to compute the corresponding cumulative density functions F G R and F B R . When the challenger is a left-wing politician, the symmetric signal is defined analogously. 
Analysis
Consider any benchmark likelihood function ⇡ that satisfies (A. Consider a right-wing incumbent with ideology i > w B . Her choices reduce to deciding whether (1) to compromise to w G in order to ensure re-election even when the signal about a challenger is good; (2) to compromise to w B and win re-election only when the signal about a challenger's ideology is bad, which happens with probability (1 ⇢); or (3) to implement her ideal policy i and lose re-election for sure. Thus, compromising politicians i > w B must decide whether to compromise all the way to w G to ensure victory, or only to compromise partially to w B and be ousted from o ce with probability ⇢ each period when she draws a challenger who generates a good signal realization.
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For politician i w B , the direct period payo↵ cost of implementing policy
. Because i  1 and w B > w G , this cost is strictly less than 2(w B w G ). Consequently, when w B w G is close to zero, this cost is even closer to zero. The direct benefit from choosing w G instead of w B is the increase in the probability of re-election from (1 ⇢) to one, that is, a probability increase of ⇢ > 0.
Hence, if w B is close enough to w G , then any incumbent with ideology i 2 [w B , 1] faces a small marginal cost of changing her policy choice from w B to w G , but a discrete positive benefit from guaranteeing re-election and avoiding replacement by a challenger. Thus, when the di↵erence (w B w G ) is small, the option to compromise to w G strictly dominates the option to compromise to w B , so that the relevant decision for incumbents i 2 [w B , 1] becomes whether to compromise to w G or to choose as policy their own ideology.
We focus on the case where all politicians who choose to compromise do so by compromising to w G . A su cient condition for no incumbent to compromise to w B , i.e., for all compromising incumbents to compromise to w G , is that the signal about the challenger be su ciently noisy. This reflects the practical observation that when signals are noisy, w G is not that much smaller than w B so that an incumbent who finds it optimal to compromise, might as well compromise a little more, in order to ensure victory. We later investigate what "su ciently noisy" signals mean in a setting where uncertainty over ideologies is described by linear densities.
Lemma 1 Suppose F R satisfies (A.1) and ⇡ satisfies (A.2). If the signal ⇧ about the challenger is su ciently noisy ( is su ciently small) then no incumbent compromises to w B .
Thus, when the signal about the challenger is informative, but su ciently noisy, equilibrium outcomes are characterized by the two re-election cuto↵s described above, 0 < w G < w B < 1, and one compromise cuto↵ c. To answer this question, we make a technical assumption that voters are su ciently patient with discount factors > ⇤⇤ (F R ), where given any ideology distribution F R satisfying (A.1), ⇤⇤ (F R ) 0 is the minimum discount factor such that for all 2 ( ⇤⇤ (F R ), 1),
As goes from zero to one,
strictly increases from 1 to infinity. Therefore,
i.e., our results hold for all 2 (0, 1).
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Proposition 3 Suppose F R satisfies (A.1), ⇡ satisfies (A.2), and voters are patient, 2
. Then voters strictly prefer not to receive signals about the challenger if the signal ⇧ is su ciently noisy ( is su ciently small).
Thus, learning about whether a challenger is more likely to be a moderate or an extremist reduces voter welfare. To understand the result, let w ⇤ be the equilibrium re-election standard and c ⇤ be the compromising cuto↵ when the signal is completely uninformative ( = 0). If is positive, but small, politicians only compromise to w G . The key is that re-election cuto↵ 17 More generally, > ⇤⇤ (F R ) is su cient, but not necessary, for Proposition 3; we suspect that regardless of the level of 2 (0, 1), voters strictly prefer not to receive su ciently noisy signals about challengers.
w G is stricter than w ⇤ , w G < w ⇤ , reflecting that voters are more favorably disposed to a challenger with a good signal. That is, the presence of an informative signal forces incumbents to compromise by more to ensure re-election. As a result, fewer incumbents compromise, i.e., c < c ⇤ , and more incumbents implement their own extreme ideologies. This hurts all voters.
Moreover, the informative signal about the challenging candidate's ideological preferences only a↵ects the winning vote margin and not who wins-it does not improve the selection of winning challenging candidates. This is because whether a challenging candidate wins or not does not depend on whether there is a good or bad signal about her ideology, but only on whether or not she faces an extremist incumbent who chose not to compromise.
To glean a deeper understanding for the result, recall that when signals are completely uninformative, i.e., when = 0, the median voter is just indi↵erent between re-electing an incumbent who adopts the equilibrium standard w ⇤ as policy, and trying the risky challenger.
The median voter does not internalize that if he set a slacker standard, then more extreme incumbents would choose to compromise to win re-election, rather than locate extremely, which would raise voter welfare. The key is that the welfare gain from greater compromise is first-order, while the cost from slightly ine cient replacement is second-order. 18 Slightly informative signals induce the median voter to set a more demanding standard for re-election, i.e., to reduce w G ; and because all incumbents who compromise do so to w G , this serves to set a more demanding standard for re-election, hurting voters. Moreover, voter welfare continues to decrease following any increase in the signals informativeness that decreases w G without leading incumbents to compromise to w B .
This powerful negative result regarding the welfare costs of learning about challengers holds as long as no incumbent type compromises to w B in equilibrium. Proposition 3 only assumes that the signal about the challenger is su ciently noisy as a su cient condition for 18 In fact, Lemma A.1 in the Appendix proves the stronger result that were a social planner to impose any re-election standard w that is stricter than the equilibrium standard, w < w that in equilibrium voters would benefit from stricter re-election thresholds. A key di↵erence between these models and ours is that in our model politicians and voters are horizontally di↵erentiated by ideology, while in these other papers politicians are not policy motivated-they are vertically di↵erentiated by ability and choose costly e↵ort levels that are not directly observed by voters.
no incumbent to compromise to w B (Lemma 1). But how small does have to be in practice?
The bound on the signal's informativeness for all compromising incumbents to choose w G is an intricate function of model parameters. In particular, the signal's information content as captured by is a measure of information about a challenger's fundamental characteristics (her ideology). However, how ideology translates into actual policy choices and hence the median voter's expected payo↵ from electing a challenger depends on the equilibrium of the game. For instance, a signal may be very informative about a challenger's ideology, but if most challengers compromise in equilibrium, the payo↵ relevant information content of the signal may be small. Hence, if the parameters of the model are such that many incumbents compromise, the result in Lemma 1 may hold even for very informative signals. In particular, one expects the result to hold for higher when an incumbent's incentives to compromise are higher-when agents are very patient or the unconditional distribution of challengers'
ideologies is more extreme. We now show that this intuition holds for our linear density parameterization.
Linear Densities with Signals
We focus on signal ⇧ when the prior distribution f R and the posterior distributions f 
Recall that ↵ captures the degree of ideological moderation, where a higher ↵ implies a more moderate ideology distribution. Hence, voters start with a prior belief ↵ about the degree of the challenger's ideology moderation, then their beliefs rise to ↵ G after observing a good signal s G , and fall to ↵ B after a bad signal s B .
If the prior probability of a good signal is ⇢ 2 (0, 1), then Bayes' rule yields:
To guarantee that the posteriors ↵ G and ↵ B are always between 0 and 2, we assume that 0 < ↵ ⇢ < 1 and define the bounds ↵ = ↵ + (1 ⇢) and ↵ = ↵ ⇢. Conditional on the right-wing challenger's ideology i, the benchmark likelihood function ⇡ generates realization s G with probability
Note that ⇡ satisfies (A.2),
Substitute (6) into (4) . Signal ⇧ generates realization s G with conditional probability
Integrating over ideologies i 2 [0, 1], the overall probability of a good signal is ⇢. After receiving a signal, voters update their beliefs using Bayes' rule:
where ↵ G ⌘ ↵ + (1 ⇢) captures the expected increased degree of ideological moderation, and
where ↵ B ⌘ ↵ ⇢ captures the expected decreased degree of ideological moderation.
That is, the distance between the posterior beliefs strictly increases with the signal's informational content , as the signal "rotates" the linear posterior around i = 0.5. Figure 5 illustrates prior and posterior beliefs for di↵erent parameter values.
We numerically solve the model when good and bad signals are equally likely (⇢ = ), for di↵erent values of and ↵. Figure 6 shows that as long as agents are even modestly patient with a discount factor that exceeds 0.3, no incumbent compromises to w B even when = 1 so the signal is maximally informative. 19 More generally, the region where incumbents never compromise to w B is greater when agents value the future more ( is higher) and the overall It is worthwhile to reflect on our two welfare results. We find that under plausible scenarios, more information about challengers impairs welfare. In contrast, while more moderate distributions of challenger ideologies impair voter welfare if concentrated su ciently on centrists, they can enhance voter welfare if moderation is concentrated more on extremists.
To understand what underlies the di↵erence, observe that with a more moderate pool of challengers, a challenger who replaces an incumbent is likely better-selection improves. In contrast, whenever compromising incumbents always do so by enough to ensure reelection, electoral outcomes only hinge on an incumbent's policy choices-more informative signals only serve to force incumbents to compromise by more to ensure re-election. Thus, the first-order e↵ect of improving the distribution of challengers is to raise the value of replacing an incumbent with a new challenger. In contrast, the first-order e↵ect of improving the information about challengers is to raise the cost of compromise to incumbents.
Endogenous Information Transmission
In the on-line Appendix we endogenize the information transmitted to voters about challengers, by examining cheap-talk messages sent by informed interest groups. Below we highlight some of these results. will not learn about the challenger, when the value of this information is negative.
Conclusion
Our paper focus on two questions. First, how do changes in the ideology distribution of candidates a↵ect the equilibrium behavior of incumbent politicians? Voters can only credibly threaten to replace an incumbent who implements policies that are too extreme if they expect the challenging candidate to implement better policies. However, improving this outside option-having challengers with preferences closer to those of most voters-need not benefit voters. This is because more moderate challengers reduce the incentives generated by party competition for an incumbent to compromise, since losing to a more moderate challenger is less costly. A Appendix
A.1 Equilibrium in the Basic Model
In this section we briefly describe the equations that characterize equilibrium outcomes.
Given the fundamentals and F R , equilibrium behavior is fully characterized by a unique pair of cuto↵s w and c. We start by summarizing the two indi↵erence conditions that pin down these equilibrium cuto↵s -the full equilibrium derivation can be found in Bernhardt It is useful to define the following auxiliary equilibrium values. Given the fundamentals and F R and the unique equilibrium cuto↵s 0 < w < c < 1, define the following:
Expected Payo↵: Let U R i be the discounted expected payo↵ of a voter with ideology i from electing an untried challenger from party R, and similarly define U L i for party L.
Expected Policy: Define the auxiliary values E R and E L as the unique solutions to the following system of equations
where by symmetry E R = E L . We can then rewrite (9) as
We now derive the remaining equilibrium equations in three steps.
Step 1) In any symmetric equilibrium the median voter is indi↵erent between a left-and a right-wing challenger, U R 0 = U L 0 ⌘ U 0 , so we can rewrite (7) as
21 E R and E L can be interpreted as the discounted expected equilibrium policies, following the associated elections of right-wing and left-wing challengers. Note that equations (9) and (10) are similar to equations (7) and (8), were we substitute (i y) 2 by y.
In equilibrium, the median voter indi↵erence condition (C.1) implies that
Together (12) and (13) imply
Step 2) We show that the expected discounted payo↵ to voter i of electing an untried challenger is related to the median voter's payo↵ according to
To see this, add
R to both sides of (7). In the RHS of the new equation, substitute E R by the RHS of (9),
Simplify to obtain
Similarly, add
L to both sides of (8) and use (10) . Simplify to obtain
Using the symmetry between f L and f R , note that equations (12), (17) and (18) all have the exact same structure (as a function of the expression on the left-hand side). Together they imply that in equilibrium we must have
Therefore (15) and (16) must hold, concluding this step.
Step 3) From (13), (16) and symmetry E L = E R , we have
Using (19), compromise cuto↵ c is then defined by the indi↵erence condition (C.2), (c w)
We solve quadratic equation (20) for the relevant c > w > 0 solution,
Equilibrium is then defined by the unique cuto↵s w ⇤ and c ⇤ and auxiliary value E R⇤ that solve the system of equations (11), (14) and (21).
A.2 Auxiliary Results
We now provide two useful results.
Remark 2: Fix anyk 2 (0, 1). Take any distributions F R and
where the inequality follows immediately from F R F OSD F 0 R and the fact that g is weakly increasing. That is,
where the inequality follows from
The inequality is then strict when there exists i ⇤ <k such that
Remark 3: Fix any pair of ideology distributions F R and F 0 R that satisfies (A.1), such that
Let {w( ), c( )} and {w 0 ( ), c 0 ( )} be the corresponding equilibrium cuto↵s when the discount factor is . Then there exists a cuto↵
, the following inequalities hold:
Proof: Intuitively, the result follows from the fact that, if is su ciently large, then compromise cuto↵s c and c 0 are su ciently close to one, while w and w 0 are su ciently close to zero. A formal proof is given by Lemma B.3 in the on-line Appendix.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Consider distributions F R and F Let {w, c} be the equilibrium cuto↵s with fundamentals { , F R }, where we omit the cuto↵s' implicit dependence on the fundamentals since we are holding fundamentals fixed. Let U 0 be the median voter's payo↵ defined by (12) , and E R as defined by (11) . To simplify
and rewrite (21) as c = w (1 ) + E R + . Since w > 0 and E R > 0, it follows that > 0. Moreover, c < 1 implies < 1.
, and 0 be the corresponding values for the equilibrium with funda-
We want to show that voters (weakly) prefer F R , that is, U  0. By contradiction, suppose that U > 0, which implies that w 0 < w, or simply w < 0. Definek = max{k, w}. Then w < 0 implies that w 0 < w k < min{c, c 0 } by (22) and (23). We have two cases.
Case 1) Suppose w 0 < w k < c  c 0 , i.e., w < 0, but c 0. Equation (25) then implies that E R + > 0. From the definition of , for 0 to hold when w < 0, it must be that E R > 0. We now derive a contradiction to
Using this fact and (11) we have
Add and subtract R w
di from the RHS of (26) to obtain
The LHS of (27) is strictly positive by assumption. Next we show that the RHS is strictly negative, which yields a contradiction. Note that
where the inequality follows from Remark 2 in Section A.2. 
where the last inequality follows from
c + E R = < 0. Finally, the remaining integral on the RHS of (27) is negative, i.e., E R < 0, by assumption. Thus, each of the terms on the RHS is negative, a contradiction.
Case 2) Now suppose suppose w 0 < w k < c 0 < c, which implies w  0 and c < 0. Using (12) and the fact that f 0
Add and subtract
On the RHS, substitute U = w 02 +w 2 (1 ) and bring all U terms to the LHS,
The LHS of (29) is positive since U > 0. Since the RHS term R w w 0 ( w 2 +i 2 )
(1 ) f 0 R (i)di is negative, for the RHS of (29) to be positive it must be the case that
The LHS of (30) captures the direct (beneficial) impact on the median voter's payo↵, when we change from F R to the more moderate ideology distribution F 
di from the RHS, and move the E R terms to the LHS,
Since the third and fourth integrals are negative, and c 0 < c, this implies
Using the definition of we have
There are two sub-cases to consider.
Multiply both sides of this inequality by the strictly positive number (c 02 w 02 ) to obtain
Since < 1, the LHS of (32) is strictly smaller than the RHS of (30). Therefore,
However, the LHS of (33) 
Because
Multiply both sides by 2 to obtain
Since E R < 0 and w < 0, it must be that < 0. Since w < 0 and < 0, it must be that c < E R (see (25)). Together c < E R and (35) imply
Bring the c terms to the LHS and divide both sides by 
Rewrite (38) as
Together (37) and (39) imply
and rewrite (40) as
However, the LHS of (41) 
. We want to show that U < 0. By contradiction, suppose U 0, so that w 0  w. Repeat the steps from Case 1 to arrive at (27) . Now the LHS of (27) is weakly positive, E R 0. To arrive at a contradiction, we prove that the RHS of (27) is strictly negative. This follows because inequality (28) is now strict. This is so because function g defined in footnote 22 is strictly
, so we can use the strict inequality result from Remark 2. Similarly repeat the steps in Case 2, and arrive at equations (33) and (41), which now feature weak inequalities. However, the contradiction is that the LHS of (33) and (41) are now strictly negative. This follows since in each case the constructed function g strictly increases at i ⇤ and
, so we can apply Remark 2.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Fix any discount 2 (0, 1) and any ideology distribution F 
Recall that for any F 0 R and > 0, it must be that 0 < w Take any distribution F R that satisfies (A.1), such that
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Following the steps in the proof of 
, and k ⇤  w 0 , rewriting (29) for this case yields
Assume by contradiction that U 0. Then, the RHS must also be positive, and hence,
Note that f . Therefore, (44) implies 
One can verify that f R is an absolutely continuos density function and f R f
payo↵ from electing an untried challenger following a good signal strictly exceeds his expected payo↵ after observing a bad signal. Therefore, if w G and w B are the re-election standards after observing good and bad signals, then 0 < w G < w B < 1.
The median voter's expected payo↵ from electing a challenger after a good signal is U G 0 . The expected payo↵ from re-electing an incumbent who adopts policy w G and is always re-elected is
. Thus, the median voter's indi↵erence condition can be written as
The median voter's expected payo↵ from electing a challenger after a bad signal is U B 0 . When the incumbent implements policy w B , she is re-elected when the signal about the challenger is bad, which happens with probability (1 ⇢); the incumbent then implements w B again next period. She loses re-election when the signal is good (probability ⇢), in which case she is replaced by the challenger, who delivers expected payo↵ U G 0 to the median voter. Hence, the median voter's indi↵erence condition implies
i .
Solve this median voter indi↵erence condition for
Subtract (47) from (46) and then solve for
In our stationary equilibrium, an incumbent's policy choice is only a function of her ideology, and not past signal realizations. Therefore, the only di↵erence between U G 0 and U B 0 in the LHS is the probability distribution over ideologies. Given our assumptions about the signal, this di↵erence goes to zero as goes to zero. Therefore, if the signal is su ciently noisy, the di↵erence in re-election standards (w 2 B w 2 G ) must also be small. For politician i w B , the direct period payo↵ cost of implementing policy w G instead of
. Because i  1 and w B > w G , this cost is strictly less than 2(w B w G ). Consequently, if w B w G is close to zero, then this cost is even closer to zero. The direct benefit from choosing w G instead of w B is the increase in the probability of re-election from (1 ⇢) to one, that is, a probability increase of ⇢ > 0. Hence, if w B is close enough to w G , then any incumbent with ideology i 2 [w B , 1] faces a small marginal cost of changing her policy choice from w B to w G , but a discrete positive benefit from guaranteeing re-election and avoiding replacement by a challenger. Thus, when the di↵erence (w B w G ) is small, the option to compromise to w G strictly dominates the option to compromise to w B , so that the relevant decision for incumbents i 2 [w B , 1] is whether to compromise to w G or to choose as policy their own ideology, which concludes the proof.
A.6 A stricter re-election cuto↵
Before proving Proposition 3, we ask: would voters benefit if they could commit to a more demanding re-election cuto↵ w?
Lemma A.1 Suppose F R satisfies (A.1) and let We now show that voter welfare decreases if we impose an exogenous 24 reelection standard w < w ⇤ . Given w, the incumbent is reelected if she adopts a policy in the set [ w, w], and loses to the challenger otherwise. As before, centrist politicians [ w, w] choose to implement their preferred policies and are reelected. Politicians with non-centrist ideologies must choose whether to compromise to be reelected or not. To compute the new optimal strategy of politicians, we must simultaneously solve for a new compromise cuto↵c and new expected payo↵s from electing challengers. In particular, a new median voter payo↵Ũ 0 . That is, although the ideology of a challenger is drawn from the same distribution F R (or F L ) as before, the endogenous behavior of politicians is a↵ected by the stricter reelection cuto↵ w.
In Section A.1 we use the system of equations (11), (12) , (13) and (21) Step 1) We first provide some basic inequalities. When the exogenous cuto↵ is w = 0 we haveŨ 0 (0) < , where the last inequality follows from Ũ 0 (w) w 2 (1 ) . This implies˜ (w) > 0. 
Step 2) We now show that Each of the terms in the brackets is strictly positive. Therefore, @E R (w) @w > 0, proving Step 2.
Step 3 .
Step 4) Substitute 
The term Note that if is su ciently small, then it must be the case that w G < w ⇤ . Moreover, Lemma A.1 also implies that voter welfare continues to decrease following any increase in the signals informativeness ( ) that decreases w G without leading incumbents to compromise to w B .
